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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THESTATFOFTTTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 2002020 J ^SC

JOSE LUIS C.VICENTE,

Ct. App. No. 20000955-CA

Defendant/Respondent.

JURISDICTION
This Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari to review the issue of
whether the Court of Appeals properly reached the merits of this appeal when
Defendant/Respondent Jose Luis C. Vicente ("Respondentfl or "Vicente") was at large.
See State's petition for writ of certiorari ("St. pet.") at 1. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001).
QUESTION PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Vicente did not appear at sentencing and has not yet been apprehended. The
Court of Appeals held that Vicente's rights were violated when the judge sentenced
Vicente in absentia to the statutory maximum without affording counsel the opportunity
to speak. The only question on certiorari is whether the Court of Appeals abused its
discretion in not dismissing the appeal when Vicente was at large but the record
demonstrates reversible error.

Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals for correctness. State v. Lavman. 1999 UT 79, ^|3, 985 P.2d 911 (further
citation omitted). The underlying issue of whether the Court of Appeals should have
adjudicated the merits of this appeal was subject to an abuse of discretion standard. See
State v. Vicente, 2002 UT App 43, ^[3 (unpublished)1 (exercising discretion and declining
State's request that it dismiss the appeal); Hardy v. Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 473 (Utah
1981) (per curiam) (discussing circumstances under which an appellate court declines
review); State v. Mova, 815 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Utah App. 1991) (exercising discretion
and refusing to dismiss appeal even though defendant was a fugitive); State v. Nath . 52
P.3d 857, 862 (Id. 2002) (recognizing that an appellate court has discretion as to whether
to dismiss an appeal); Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1993)
(recognizing that Supreme Court has discretion to dismiss an appeal); see. discussion
infra at 11-14.
OPINION BELOW
A copy of Vicente, 2002 UT App 43 (unpublished) is in Addendum A.
TEXT OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The text of Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees to a
criminal defendant a constitutional right to appeal is in Addendum B.

1

Vicente is not a published decision. The parties have numbered the paragraphs
for ease of review.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 7, 1999, the State charged Vicente with unlawful possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, on or about March 4, 1999.
R. 2-3. On August 15, 2000, through an interpreter, Vicente pled guilty to attempted
unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a class A misdemeanor, before
the Honorable William W. Barrett. R. 67[l]:l-5; 23. Judge Barrett scheduled sentencing
for September 8, 2000, before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. R. 33, 35. When
Vicente failed to appear at sentencing subsequently scheduled for September 22, 2000,
Judge Frederick sentenced Vicente to the maximum one-year sentence. R. 44-45.
Defense counsel filed a "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence" on September 29,
2000, claiming that the sentencing procedure violated Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
22(a) and due process. R. 46-47; see Motion in Addendum C. On October 4, 2000, the
judge entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Sentencing Defendant
in Absentia." R. 48-49; see Order in Addendum D.
Through counsel, Vicente timely appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. That
Court vacated the sentence, holding that Judge Frederick imposed sentence in violation
of due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a). Vicente, 2002 UT App 43.
The State petitioned for certiorari review of a single issue—whether the Court of Appeals
erred in adjudicating the merits of the appeal when Vicente was a fugitive. St. pet. at 1.
This Court granted the petition.

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to the probable cause statement in the Information, a police officer
followed another individual to a residence where Vicente answered the door. R. 3. The
officer searched the residence and found five ounces of marijuana and a scale. R. 3.
Vicente pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute, a class A misdemeanor, before Judge Barrett. R. 67[l]:l-5. Vicente speaks
Spanish and the proceedings at the plea colloquy were translated by an interpreter.
R. 67[l]:l-2; 23. As part of the plea proceedings before Judge Barrett, defense counsel
indicated that the state would recommend thirty days jail with credit for time served.
R. 67[1]:1. Vicente had served almost three weeks in jail when he pled guilty and was
released pending sentencing. R. 5, 8, 21, 31. Pursuant to the State's sentencing
recommendation, Vicente would have been required to serve a little more than one
additional week in jail.
Judge Barrett scheduled sentencing before Judge Frederick. R. 33, 35. The
record contains a form indicating the date of sentencing as September 8, 2000, and
referring Vicente to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for a presentence report. R. 33.
The form is in English. R. 33. Judge Barrett told Vicente (through an interpreter) at the
plea hearing that he must go to AP&P for a presentence report. R. 67[l]:4-5. Judge
Barrett did not, however, tell Vicente on the record that he needed to appear at
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sentencing or the date of sentencing or that sentencing would be before Judge Frederick.
R.67[l].
Sentencing was somehow rescheduled from September 8 to September 22, 2000.
R. 33-5, 43, 44. The record does not reflect whether Vicente appeared at the courtroom
of Judge Barrett or Judge Frederick on September 8, 2000, or whether Vicente was
informed of the change in sentencing date. On September 11, 2000, Judge Frederick
revoked Vicente's release and issued an arrest warrant because Vicente had not appeared
at AP&P for preparation of a presentence report. R. 41.
On September 22, 2000, when Vicente did not appear before Judge Frederick for
sentencing, without affording either party the opportunity to speak and therefore without
being informed of the favorable sentencing recommendation of thirty days jail with credit
for time served, Judge Frederick concluded that Vicente had voluntarily absented himself
and imposed sentence. R. 67[2]:l-2. Although the State had agreed to recommend thirty
days jail with credit for the approximately three weeks Vicente had already served, Judge
Frederick sentenced Vicente to the maximum one-year jail sentence. R. 67[1]:1; 44. In
imposing sentence, Judge Frederick did not give either party the opportunity to speak,
did not consider the State's sentencing recommendation, and did not base the sentence on
reliable and relevant information. R. 67[2]; Vicente, 2002 UT App 43, %l.
The judge left the previously issued warrant for Vicente's arrest in place.
R. 67[2]:2. Although the record does not indicate whether Vicente has been
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apprehended on that warrant, at the time the State requested that the Court of Appeals
dismiss this appeal, jail records indicated that Vicente was not incarcerated.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. The Court of Appeals Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Considering
the Merits of this Appeal.
An appellate court has discretion to decide whether to dismiss an appeal when the
defendant is at large. Utah case law and case law from other jurisdictions establishes that
dismissal of an appeal when a defendant is a fugitive is not automatic and instead an
appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to dismiss an appeal in
such circumstances.
The State is incorrect when it claims that this Court's decision in Hardy, 636 P.2d
473, mandates dismissal because Vicente is at large. Hardy simply allows an appellate
court to exercise its discretion to dismiss an appeal when a defendant has escaped after
the appeal has been filed but does not mandate dismissal under such circumstances.
Additionally, this Court's subsequent decisions in State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704
(Utah 1985) and State v. Verikokides. 925 P.2d 1255, 1256 (Utah 1996) clarify that an
appellate court cannot automatically dismiss an appeal when a defendant escapes and
instead must consider whether the defendant's absence prejudices the State or impacts
adversely on the appellate process. In this case where Vicente did not appear at
sentencing in the trial court and was immediately sentenced in absentia, neither the State
nor the appellate court has been adversely impacted by the absence.
6

Courts consider various factors in deciding whether to dismiss an appeal when a
criminal defendant is at large. In Utah, where criminal defendants have a state
constitutional right to appeal which is considered "essential to a fair criminal proceeding"
(Tuttfe, 713 P.2d at 704), appellate courts must exercise that discretion so as not to
violate the constitutional right to appeal. Other factors which an appellate court
considers in deciding whether to dismiss an appeal when a defendant is absent include
inter alia (1) the impact of the defendant's absence on the appellate process or the State,
(2) whether the defendant failed to appear in the trial court or escaped after an appeal
was filed, (3) whether reversible error occurred below, (4) whether judicial economy
favors hearing the appeal on its merits, and (5) any other relevant circumstances.
In this case, the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion in considering
the merits of this appeal where neither the appellate process nor the State has been
prejudiced by Vicente's absence. Additional factors also support the Court of Appeals'
decision to consider the merits of this appeal. As the Court of Appeals indicated, the
unlawfulness of the sentence and judicial economy supported its decision to decide the
case on its merits. Vicente, 2002 UT App 43, TJ3. The fact that Vicente failed to appear
at sentencing in the trial court rather than escaping after the appeal was filed also weighs
in favor of considering the merits; any affront was to the trial court and a significant
connection does not exist between Vicente's absence and the appellate process.

7

A review of the circumstances of this case and Utah case law demonstrates that the
decision of the Court of Appeals to consider the merits of this appeal should be upheld.
Point II. The Court of Appeals Properly Exercised Its Discretion to Vacate
the Illegal Sentence Regardless of Whether It Relied on Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 22(e) as the Basis for Reviewing that Illegal Sentence
on Appeal.
The State's new argument that the Court of Appeals could not rely on Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 22(e) to review this illegal sentence when the issue was raised for
the first time on appeal because Vicente was absent likewise fails. An appellate court
can exercise its discretion to consider the merits of an appeal regardless of whether
rule 22(e) is the procedure utilized to reach the issue, and nothing in Utah case law
suggests otherwise. In fact, the rationale for allowing an appellate court to consider an
illegal sentence pursuant to rule 22(e) even though the issue was not raised below applies
with full force when the defendant is absent. That rationale is that the sentence is illegal
or void and considerations of judicial economy support reaching the issue and vacating
the illegal sentence at the earliest opportunity. The same holds true in this case where the
sentence was illegally imposed and judicial economy supports vacating it as soon as
possible.
Although an appellate court can properly vacate a sentence pursuant to Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 22(e) even if the defendant is absent, this Court need not address
this issue because the Court of Appeals did not resolve the appeal on this basis. Instead,
the Court indicated that Vicente could file a rule 22(e) motion in the trial court and
8

judicial economy therefore favored hearing the appeal on the merits. Vicente, 2002 UT
App 43, *p n. 1. This Court also need not address the State's claim that an appellate
court cannot address an issue raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to rule 22(e)
because the State has not adequately briefed this issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REACHING THE MERITS OF THIS APPEAL
WHERE RESPONDENT WAS UNLAWFULLY SENTENCED
IN ABSENTIA AND REMAINED AT LARGE.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Judge Frederick violated due
process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) in sentencing Vicente in absentia to
the statutory maximum without affording defense counsel or the State the opportunity to
speak at sentencing and without basing the sentence on relevant and reliable information.
Vicente, 2002 UT App 43, ^[2. In its petition for writ of certiorari, the State did not take
issue with the Court of Appeals' holding that the sentencing procedure in this case was
so flawed that a new sentencing hearing is required. Instead, the State claims that despite
the fundamental unfairness of the sentencing procedure utilized in this case, the Court of
Appeals should have dismissed this appeal and refused to decide the case on the merits
because Vicente did not appear at sentencing and remains at large.
The Court of Appeals properly rejected the State's request that it dismiss this
appeal and instead exercised its discretion to consider the merits because the sentencing
was fundamentally flawed, requiring that Vicente be resentenced.
9

The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying upon cases
concluding that an appeal taken by a criminal defendant who is a fugitive
may be dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant returns to the
jurisdiction and if the State cannot demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by
reinstatement. See, e.g., State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985).
Because [State v.] Wanosik[, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615] is dispositive
of Vicente's appeal and requires a remand for resentencing, we decline to
dismiss this appeal.
Vicente. 2002 UT App 43, ^[3. Because the error in sentencing was evident and required
that the sentence be vacated, the Court of Appeals refused to dismiss the appeal.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals pointed out that judicial economy supported its
decision to decide the merits of this case. Id., n. 1. Because the sentence was imposed in
an illegal manner, the sentence could be attacked in the trial court pursuant to Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 22(e) even if the Court of Appeals had dismissed the appeal. Id.
Rather than opening the door to additional time-consuming litigation to reach the
inevitable point where the illegally imposed sentence in this case was vacated, the Court
of Appeals exercised its discretion to proceed in the most efficient manner and consider
the merits in the appeal before it.
FN1. Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Vicente could
challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct
... a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."); see also
Wanosik, 241 UT App at n. 11 (stating issues regarding illegality of the
sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal
under Rule 22(e)). Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal
from the sentence and preserve the State's ability to seek dismissal in any
appeal taken after resentencing.

10

Vicente, 2002 UT App 43, ^|3, n. 1. The Court of Appeals recognized that Vicente could
simply raise this issue-and prevail-in the trial court if the Court of Appeals were to
dismiss the appeal. Because the sentencing procedure was flawed and prolonged
litigation would be required to reach the same end result of vacating the sentence if the
Court of Appeals were to dismiss the appeal, the Court of Appeals chose to consider the
merits.
In this case where the sentencing procedure was fundamentally flawed, the Court
of Appeals properly exercised its discretion in denying the State's request that it dismiss
this appeal. The Court's concern for judicial economy as well as the circumstances of
this case further demonstrate that the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion
in declining the State's request that it dismiss this appeal.
A. AN APPELLATE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO DISMISS AN
APPEAL OR CONSIDER THE MERITS WHEN THE APPELLANT IS
A FUGITIVE.
An appellate court has discretion to dismiss an appeal or consider the merits when
the appellant is a fugitive. See Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704 (citing Hardy, 636 P.2d 473).
Utah decisions that have considered the issue of whether to dismiss a criminal appeal
because the defendant is at large have used language that demonstrates the discretionary
nature of this decision. For example, in Hardy, this Court used language suggesting that
the decision to dismiss an appeal is discretionary with the appellate court. This Court
discussed "declining to adjudicate the merits" of an appeal when the defendant had
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escaped while the appeal was pending and allowed for dismissal where there was ,u [n]o
persuasive reason'" to adjudicate the merits. Hardy. 636 P.2d at 473 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals likewise has recognized that the decision to dismiss an
appeal when a defendant is a fugitive is discretionary with the appellate court. See
Mova. 815 P.2d at 1313; Vicente. 2002 UT App 43,1J3. In Mova. the Court of Appeals
declined the State's request that it dismiss the appeal where the defendant was a fugitive.
815 P.2d at 1313. The Court pointed out that it declined that request because of "the
potential for further mischief resulting from the [illegally imposed] sentence" and instead
considered the merits of the appeal and vacated the sentence. Id. at 1313-1318.
The Court of Appeals took the same approach in exercising its discretion to
consider the merits in this case as it did in Moya. In both cases, an illegally imposed
sentence was'in place. Because the illegally imposed sentence could create further
problems and needed to be vacated, the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion to
consider the merits of the appeal even though the defendant was at large. Moya, 815
P.2d at 1313; Vicente. 2002 UT App 43, ^3.
A review of case law from other jurisdictions further demonstrates that the
decision to dismiss a criminal appeal when the defendant is a fugitive is discretionary
with the appellate court. See Ortega-Rodriguez. 507 U.S. at 239-40 (recognizing
appellate courts have discretion to dismiss an appeal when a defendant is a fugitive);
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Nath, 52 P.3d at 862 (same); State v. Collins. 42 S.W.3d 736, 738-39 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001) (exercising its discretion to consider merits of a criminal appeal even though the
"escape rule" may apply); People v. Savles, 474 N.E.2d 870, 876 (111. App. Ct. 1985)
(exercising discretion to consider merits of appeal where defendant was sentenced
in absentia and remains at large); Brigman v. State, 350 P.2d 321, 322 (Okla. Ct. App.
1960) (recognizing that an appellate court has discretion to decide whether it will
proceed on the merits or dismiss an appeal when the defendant is a fugitive). Even
though other jurisdictions may not guarantee a criminal defendant the constitutional right
to appeal, they nevertheless recognize that an appeal cannot automatically be dismissed
when the defendant absconds. See.Nath, 52 P.3d at 862-63; Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S.
at 249. Instead, appellate courts decide whether to dismiss an appeal based on a
consideration of various factors such as (1) the nature of the error below, (2) the impact,
if any, that the defendant's absence has on the appellate process or the State, and (3) any
other relevant circumstances.
Rather than affording state appellate courts discretion to determine whether to
dismiss an appeal when a criminal defendant who is appealing is at large, the State asks
for a blanket rule which mandates that all criminal appeals in which the criminal
defendant is at large be dismissed. St. Brf. at 5-7. According to the State, Hardy
mandates dismissal of an appeal when the defendant is at large regardless of the
circumstances. St. Brf. at 5-7. Hardy, however, simply allows an appellate court to
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dismiss an appeal when the defendant has escaped but does not mandate such a
dismissal. Subsequent decisions from this Court in Tuttle. 713 P.2d at 704, and
Verikokides. 925 P.2d at 1256, clarify that an appellate court cannot automatically
dismiss an appeal when a defendant escapes and instead must consider whether the State
or appellate process is adversely impacted by the defendant's fugitive status in
determining whether the state constitutional right to appeal will be violated by the
dismissal of an appeal. See Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704 (an appeal that was dismissed after
the defendant escaped may be reinstated unless the State shows prejudice); Verikokides ,
925 P.2d at 1256 (automatic dismissal of a criminal appeal of former fugitive is
unconstitutional unless State shows prejudice). Tuttle and Verikokides further show that
an appellate court is not required to automatically dismiss an appeal when a defendant is
at large, and that an appellate court must instead exercise its discretion in determining
whether to decide a case on its merits when the defendant is absent.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION TO CONSIDER THIS APPEAL ON THE MERITS
WHERE VICENTE DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL AND
THE STATE HAS NOT BEEN PREJUDICED.
While appellate courts have discretion to dismiss appeals under certain
circumstances, that discretion must be exercised so that the constitutional right of a
criminal defendant to appeal his/her conviction is not violated. Article I, section 12 of
the Utah Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to appeal a criminal conviction.
That right is "essential to a fair criminal proceeding" and cannot be lightly forfeited.
14

Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704. In a case such as the present one where the sentence was
illegally imposed, the right to appeal ensures fairness and due process by providing a
means to review and vacate the sentence.
Although this Court held in Hardy that a criminal appeal could be dismissed when
the defendant escaped after filing the appeal (Hardy., 636 P.2d at 474), it later clarified in
Tuttle that an escape is not a knowing waiver of the right to appeal. Tuttle, 713 P.2d at
704. This Court held in Tuttle that
[i]n light of the fundamental nature of the right to appellate review of a
criminal conviction and the lack of any sound practical or policy
justification for refusing to hear the appeals of escapees after they are
returned to custody, we conclude that a criminal appeal dismissed after
escape may be reinstated unless the State can show that it has been
prejudiced by the defendant's absence and the consequent lapse of time.
Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 705.
While Tuttle does not directly overrule Hardy, it does suggest that an appeal
cannot be automatically dismissed simply because the defendant escaped after the notice
of appeal was filed. Since Tuttle tells us that such an escape is not a knowing waiver of
the right to appeal and the right to appeal should be carefully protected, dismissing an
appeal because the defendant escaped is disfavored after Tuttle. In fact, this Court
clarified in Verikokides, 925 P.2d at 1256, that an appellate court cannot automatically
dismiss a criminal appeal when a defendant escapes and instead can dismiss an appeal
only if the State can show that it is prejudiced by the defendant's absence.
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Although automatically dismissing an appeal or denying reinstatement of
an appeal of a former fugitive is unconstitutional, this court's analysis in
Tuttle does allow a criminal appeal to be dismissed or denied reinstatement
if "the State can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant's
absence and the consequent lapse of time."
kL (quoting Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 705) (emphasis added). Requiring the State to show that
it has been prejudiced by the defendant's absence in order to dismiss an appeal after the
defendant escapes is consistent with other jurisdictions that allow dismissal of an appeal
when the defendant's absence disrupts the court's operations or prejudices the State. See
e.g., Nath, 52 P.3d at 863 (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 249) ("defendant's
fugitive status alone was not enough to warrant dismissal"). In this case where the State
does not claim prejudice or adverse impact on the appellate process caused by Vicente's
absence, the Court of Appeals' decision to consider the merits of this appeal was a proper
exercise of its discretion.2

2

The State is incorrect when it argues that Hardy mandates automatic dismissal
not only because Hardy and other cases make the decision as to whether to dismiss an
appeal discretionary, but also because cases subsequent to Hardy clarify that the Article I,
section 12 right of a criminal defendant to appeal his conviction would be violated by
automatic dismissal of a criminal appeal. See discussions supra at 11-16.
The State is also incorrect that Hardy required automatic dismissal of this appeal
because Hardy involved different circumstances where Hardy escaped from custody after
his appeal was filed. By contrast, Vicente failed to appear at sentencing in the trial court
before any appeal had been filed. As the Court of Appeals concluded in Moya, Hardy is
distinguishable from cases where the defendant did not escape from custody and instead
is simply absent from supervision. Moya, 815 P.2d at 1313 n. 1.
Additionally, the State is incorrect when it asserts that the Court of Appeals
allowed its own decision in Wanosik to overrule Hardy. St. Brf. at 6-7. Aside from the
fact that Hardy does not mandate automatic dismissal in any case and is distinguishable
from this case because Hardy escaped while the appeal was pending, this assertion by the
16

C. THE FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED SENTENCING PROCEDURE,
JUDICIAL ECONOMY, AND OTHER FACTORS SUPPORT THE
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION
TO REVIEW THIS CASE ON ITS MERITS.
In determining whether to exercise discretion to dismiss an appeal when the
defendant/appellant is at large, appellate courts consider a number of factors which
include inter alia (1) the impact on the appellate process or the State caused by the
defendant's absence, (2) whether the defendant failed to appear at a trial court
proceeding or escaped after an appeal was filed, (3) whether a significant error occurred
below, (4) whether judicial economy favors considering the appeal on its merits, and (5)
any other relevant circumstances. In Utah, where criminal defendants have a state
constitutional right to appeal, the need to protect that right and ensure that it is not lightly
forfeited also figures into an assessment of whether an appeal should be dismissed
because the defendant is at large.
Courts often require prejudice to the State or some other adverse impact on the
appellate process in order to exercise their discretion by dismissing a criminal appeal.
Utah decisions have considered whether the defendant's absence has caused an adverse

State is also incorrect because the Court of Appeals relied on Wanosik for the
proposition that the sentence in this case was illegally imposed. Because the sentence
was illegally imposed as outlined in Wanosik, the Court of Appeals exercised its
discretion to decide the merits of the appeal and vacate the sentence. The Court of
Appeals' conclusion in this case that where a sentence is illegally imposed and judicial
economy is served by vacating the sentence on appeal it will exercise its discretion to
decide the merits, is not at odds with Hardy.
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impact on the appellate process or the State in deciding whether dismissal of an appeal or
the inability to review an issue on appeal violates the state constitutional right to appeal.
See e.g. Tuttle. 713 P.2d at 705; Verikokides. 925 P.2d at 1256. Other jurisdictions have
required that the defendant's absence delay or disrupt the appellate process in some way
in order to dismiss an appeal. See. e ^ Ortega-Rodriguez. 507 U.S. at 249 (recognizing
that dismissal of an appeal may be appropriate where defendant's fugitive status and
consequent delay adversely impact appellate process or prejudice government); United
States v. Delagarza-VillarreaU41 F.3d 133, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1997) (exercising discretion
to consider merits of appeal because defendant's absence did not significantly interfere
with appellate process); State v. Schneider. 888 P.2d 798, 801 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)
(exercising discretion to consider merits where defendant's fugitive status did not
interfere with appellate process).
In this case, Vicente's absence has not prejudiced the State or impacted adversely
on the appellate process. Vicente was sentenced to the one-year maximum despite the
fact that he was not present, then timely appealed. Vicente's absence did not cause a
delay in either the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Moreover, any claim that the oneyear sentence cannot be enforced because Vicente remains absent is not well taken. The
State is in the same position to enforce this sentence as it was when it proceeded to
sentence Vicente in absentia. Until this case is remanded with an order vacating the
sentence, Vicente can be arrested on the outstanding warrant and required to serve a year
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in jail. Because Vicente's absence has not prejudiced the State nor caused an adverse
impact on the appellate process, the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion by
denying the State's request that it dismiss this appeal.
Courts also consider whether the defendant went missing before sentencing or
after a notice of appeal was filed. See e ^ Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 251-52
(holding that appeal was improperly dismissed where defendant's fugitive status and
recapture occurred before appeal); Delagarza-Villareal, 141 F.3d at 138-39 (refusing to
dismiss appeal where defendant was tried in absentia and was a fugitive for almost two
years but was arrested prior to sentencing and filing a notice of appeal). The rationale for
distinguishing between flight that occurs while the case is still in the trial court and flight
that occurs after the notice of appeal is filed is that the affront is to the trial court and, in
most cases, the defendant's flight "may well lack the kind of connection to the appellate
process that would justify an appellate sanction of dismissal." Ortega-Rodriguez, 507
U.S. at 251; see also State v. Billings, 54 P.3d 470 (Id. Ct. App. 2002) (court exercises its
discretion to consider the merits where the affront was to the trial court not the appellate
court).
Along the same lines, a distinction exists between escaping after an appeal is filed
and simply failing to appear at a trial court hearing. See. Moya, 815 P.2d at 1313 n. 1
(recognizing that case is distinguishable from Hardy because defendant did not escape
from custody and claim that defendant was absent from supervision was irrelevant since
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sentence was illegal). Since the affirmative act of escaping after filing an appeal is not a
knowing waiver of the right to appeal (see. Tuttle. 713 P.2d at 704), the more passive
conduct of not appearing at sentencing in the trial court before any appeal is in place
cannot be considered an abandonment of the right to appeal. Additionally, Vicente
speaks Spanish and the record does not demonstrate that he was informed in Spanish that
he would have a different judge at sentencing or the date on which sentencing would
occur. While Vicente was told on the record through an interpreter that he needed to go
to AP&P, the information about the sentencing judge and date was on a form in English.
These circumstances further demonstrate that Vicente did not knowingly waive his right
to appeal and that the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion in reviewing this
case on the merits.
The fact that Vicente is still at large does not undermine the propriety of the Court
of Appeals exercising its discretion to consider the merits of this appeal where the
transgression occurred in the trial court prior to the filing of any notice of appeal. Failing
to appear at sentencing was not a knowing waiver of the right to appeal, the affront was
to the trial court, and the purposes for allowing dismissal when a defendant escapes
would not have been served in this case. Moreover, Vicente's failure to appear at
sentencing does not have a connection to the appellate process which would warrant the
severe sanction of dismissing his appeal. Finally, fairness required that the appellate
court vacate the sentence that was illegally imposed when Vicente was absent.
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In cases where appellate courts refused to dismiss an appeal because the defendant
had failed to appear in the trial court rather than escaped while the case was on appeal,
the defendant was not sentenced in absentia. See Delagarza, 141 F.3d at 136
(defendant, who absconded during his trial, was apprehended twenty months later then
sentenced; appeal followed); Billings, 54 P.3d at 472 (defendant who fled jurisdiction
while out on bond awaiting sentencing was not sentenced until after he was apprehended
several years later in another state). Instead, months or even years passed before the
defendant was apprehended and sentenced. See Delagarza, 141 F.3d at 136 (defendant
apprehended more than twenty months after he absconded during a recess in his trial, and
sentenced after he was apprehended); Billings, 54 P.3d at 471-72 (defendant
apprehended six years after the incident and sentenced thereafter). Despite the fact that
the defendant was a fugitive for a significant period of time, these courts refused to
dismiss the appeals because the fugitive status did not have a connection to the appellate
process that would justify dismissal. See Billings, 54 P.3d at 472; Delagarza, 141 F.3d at
138.

Vicente's absence has already worked against him in the trial court where he was

sentenced in absentia to the statutory maximum without input from counsel. Had he not
been sentenced in absentia, he would be in the same position as Delagarza and Billings,
who were not sentenced until they were apprehended and therefore were no longer
fugitives when the appeal was pending. The fact that Vicente was sentenced in absentia
and remains at large is not a valid basis for requiring him to forfeit his right to appeal
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where Vicente's absence does not have a significant connection to the appellate process
which would justify dismissal.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. 234
also supports the Court of Appeals' decision to consider the merits of the appeal even
though Vicente remained at large at the time of the appeal. In Ortega-Rodriguez, the
defendant failed to appear at sentencing and was sentenced in absentia, Id_ at 237-238.
The defendant was apprehended eleven months later. Id. The trial court subsequently
granted the defendant's motion to be resentenced, and the defendant filed a notice of
appeal from the resentencing. Id. at 238-39. The government moved to dismiss the
appeal because Ortega-Rodriguez had become a fugitive prior to sentencing, and the
Court of Appeals granted that motion. Id. at 239. Although Ortega-Rodriguez's absence
prevented his appeal from being decided along with the appeals of his co-defendants, the
Supreme Court vacated the order of dismissal and remanded for further proceedings
because Ortega-Rodriguez's "former fugitive status may well lack the kind of connection
to the appellate process that would justify an appellate sanction of dismissal." Id. at 251.
While the Court referred to Ortega-Rodriguez's "former fugitive status" and recapture
before appeal, the focus of the decision was on the fact that the fugitive status did not
have a sufficient connection to the appellate process to justify dismissal. Id.
Like Ortega-Rodriguez, Vicente's absence did not have a sufficient connection
with the appellate process to justify dismissal where he failed to appear at sentencing and

22

was sentenced in absentia. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion
to consider this appeal on the merits where Vicente's failure to appear in the trial court
did not have a connection to the appellate process that justified the extreme sanction of
dismissal.
The nature of the error below and judicial economy are other factors considered
by courts in determining whether to dismiss an appeal. Courts exercise their discretion to
consider the merits of the appeal even though the defendant is at large when an error
fundamentally affects the proceedings below. See e.g. Brigman, 350 P.2d at 322
(appellate court exercises its discretion to decide appeal on the merits because
fundamental error requiring reversal of conviction occurred where alternate juror was
permitted to deliberate); Shamblin v. State, 210 P.2d 197, 198 (Okla. Crim. App. 1949)
(court exercises its discretion to decide the merits of the appeal where record shows
fundamental error); Moya, 815 P.2d at 1313 (Court of Appeals reviews merits where
sentence was illegal and further mischief could result if it were to dismiss the appeal);
Vicente, 2002 Ut App 43, *f3 (Court of Appeals considers merits where sentence was
imposed in violation of due process and rule 22(a)). Additionally, appellate courts
properly exercise their discretion to consider the merits of an appeal based on
considerations of judicial economy. See. generally State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860
(Utah 1995) (considerations of judicial economy support appellate review of illegal
sentence pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) even if claim was not raised
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below). In this case where an illegal sentence was imposed and interests of judicial
economy were served by vacating the sentence in the appellate court, the Court of
Appeals properly exercised its discretion in denying the State's request that it dismiss this
appeal.
A consideration of case law and the circumstances of this case demonstrates that
the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in reviewing this case on the merits and
vacating the illegally imposed sentence. First, as a matter of fairness and concern for the
integrity of the criminal justice system, the Court of Appeals properly exercised its
discretion by reviewing the illegally imposed sentence. Vicente, who did not appear at
sentencing and remains at large, did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
presence at sentencing let alone his right to appeal. If, as this Court has recognized in
Turtle, a defendant who escapes while his case is on appeal does not knowingly waive
the right to appeal, a defendant who goes missing prior to sentencing in the trial court
certainly does not knowingly waive the right to appeal.
The State, which was willing to proceed with sentencing even though Vicente was
absent, has reaped the benefit of sentencing Vicente in absentia; a sentence of one year
was in place despite the minimal sentencing recommendation, and had the Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal, that sentence would have been enforced when Vicente
was apprehended. Because appeals usually take more than a year, even if the appeal
were reinstated, Vicente would be likely to serve the entire year before getting any relief
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from an appellate court.3 It would be fundamentally unfair to sentence a defendant even
though he is not present, then refuse to review an illegal sentence because the defendant
remains absent. In fact, had the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as requested by
the State, it would have paved the way for abusive sentencing practices whenever a
defendant is not present by allowing the trial court to proceed with sentencing without
any appellate oversight. Such an approach would severely undermine the integrity of the
criminal justice system.
As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the error in sentencing required it to
exercise its discretion to consider the merits. It also properly relied on considerations of
judicial economy in exercising its discretion to consider the merits of the appeal. In
addition, the State does not claim that Vicente's absence has impacted in any way on the
appellate process or prejudiced the State. Vicente failed to appear in the trial court; his
absence is not an affront to the appellate court and does not impact on the appellate
proceedings. He did not escape while an appeal was pending; instead, he failed to appear
at sentencing and has remained at large. Under these circumstances, the Court of
Appeals properly exercised its discretion and considered the merits of the appeal, thereby
ensuring that Vicente's rights to appeal and due process were protected.

3

Anthony Wanosik, the lead defendant in the numerous cases in which Judge
Frederick sentenced the defendant in absentia to the statutory maximum without input
from counsel, served his entire one-year sentence before the Court of Appeals issued its
opinion holding that Wanosik had been sentenced in an illegal manner.
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POINT II. WHILE AN APPELLATE COURT CAN EXERCISE ITS
DISCRETION TO REVIEW AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE PURSUANT
TO UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(e) WHEN THAT
CLAIM IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL BY AN
ABSENT DEFENDANT. THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS THIS
ISSUE BECAUSE IT IS NOT PART OF THE COURT OF APPEALS'
HOLDING AND IS NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED.
The State claims for the first time in its brief on certiorari that an appellate court
cannot rely on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) to review a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner when the defendant is absent. See. Point II of St. Brf. at
7-8. This claim is incorrect because an appellate court can exercise its discretion to
review any claim on appeal, regardless of whether the claim was preserved below or is
reached by a plain error or rule 22(e) review. This Court need not decide the merits of
this claim in Point II of its brief, however, because (1) the Court of Appeals did not
review the illegal sentence pursuant to rule 22(e), and (2) the State has not adequately
briefed this claim.
A. AN APPELLATE COURT CAN CONSIDER WHETHER A
SENTENCE WAS ILLEGALLY IMPOSED UNDER UTAH RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(e) EVEN IF THE ISSUE WAS NOT
RAISED BELOW AND THE DEFENDANT IS ABSENT.
The State claims that an appellate court cannot rely on Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(e) as the basis for reviewing a claim that a sentence was illegally imposed
in circumstances where the defendant is at large. St. Brf. at 7-8. The State's claim is
incorrect because case law and rule 22(e) allow an appellate court to review an illegal
sentence even if the issue has not been raised below. Additionally, as set forth in Point I
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of this brief, Utah case law and constitutional provisions allow an appellate court to
exercise its discretion to consider the merits of an appeal even if the defendant is absent.
Consideration of the merits of an appeal includes a rule 22(e) review when an illegal
sentence has been imposed, and nothing in Utah case law, rules or statutes suggests that
such a review is not appropriate when the defendant is at large. The State's claim
therefore fails on the merits.
Rule 22(e) states, "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." In Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860, this Court held
that f,[w]hen a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can vacate the illegal
sentence without first remanding the case to the trial court, even if the matter was never
raised before." The rationale for allowing an appellate court to vacate an illegal sentence
even though the issue was raised for the first time on appeal is that the sentence is void
"and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be raisable at any time." Id. In addition, this
Court pointed out that considerations of judicial economy also supported its holding that
an appellate court can review an illegal sentence pursuant to rule 22(e) even though the
issue was not raised below. IcL The Court stated:
When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can vacate the illegal
sentence without first remanding to the trial court even if the matter was
never raised before. This makes theoretical sense because an illegal
sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be raisable at any
time. This view of the matter is also supported by considerations of
judicial economy. When the pertinent facts are undisputed and a purely
legal question with respect to which the trial court has no discretion
remains to be decided, nothing is to be gained by remanding the case to the
27

trial court. See [State v.]Pena, 869 P.2d [932] at 936 [(Utah 1994)]
("[A]ppellate courts have ... the power and duty to say what the law
is ....").
Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860. Because an illegal sentence is void, appellate courts have the
duty to define the law, and judicial economy favors an appellate court vacating an
illegally imposed sentence, this Court held in Brooks that an appellate court can vacate
an illegal sentence pursuant to rule 22(e) even if the issue was not raised in the trial
court. Id
The Brooks holding that rule 22(e) provides a procedure by which an appellate
court can vacate an illegal sentence even if the claim was not raised below applies with
equal force regardless of whether a defendant is at large. If an illegal sentence has been
imposed, the issue should be raisable at any time. Considerations of judicial economy
favor resolving the issue when it is before the appellate court and the issue is purely a
legal question, so "nothing is to be gained by remanding the case to the trial court." IcL_
A defendant's absence does not undermine the rationale for allowing an appellate
court to vacate an illegal sentence pursuant to rule 22(e). Nor has the State offered any
policy reasons or justifications for a distinction in the application of rule 22(e) based on
whether the defendant is at large. In any case where a sentence has been imposed in an
illegal manner, fairness, justice and judicial economy demand that the sentence be
vacated at the earliest opportunity.
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Nothing in Brooks or any other case suggests that an appellate court cannot
exercise its discretion to vacate an illegal sentence when the defendant is at large.
Indeed, in circumstances such as the present one where Vicente was sentenced
in absentia then appealed the illegally imposed sentence, the nature of the error requires
that the claim that the sentence was illegally imposed should be raisable at any time and
judicial economy favors reviewing it on appeal. Moreover, as set forth in Point I, it is
not an abuse of discretion to consider the merits of an appeal in a case such as this where
there is no prejudice to the State or adverse impact to the appellate process, the defendant
did not escape while an appeal was pending and instead failed to appear at sentencing,
and fairness and the integrity of the criminal justice system require that the appeal be
heard. Consideration of the merits includes a review of a patently illegal sentence
pursuant to rule 22(e) if the issue was not raised below. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860.
The State has not presented any case law or analysis that would suggest that it would be
an abuse of discretion for an appellate court to consider a case on the merits and vacate a
sentence pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) when the defendant is
absent, and Utah case law establishes such a review is proper even if the defendant is at
large.
B. THIS COURT NEED NOT DECIDE THE STATE'S CLAIM IN
POINT II BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE
THE CASE ON THIS BASIS AND THE CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY
BRIEFED.
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Although an appellate court could properly vacate a sentence when the claim that
the defendant was illegally sentenced is raised for the first time on appeal pursuant to
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), this Court need not address this issue because
the Court of Appeals did not hold that it could conduct a rule 22(e) review on appeal
even though the defendant was absent. In addition, this Court need not address this issue
because the State did not adequately brief its claim.
(1) The Court of Appeals Did Not Hold that It Could Conduct a Rule 22(e)
Review on Appeal Even Though the Defendant Was Absent.
As an initial matter, this Court need not address the State's claim that rule 22(e)
does not provide a means for appellate review when the defendant is a fugitive because
the Court of Appeals did not resolve the case on this basis. In fact, the State misreads the
Court of Appeals' decision when it argues that the Court improperly utilized rule 22(e) to
review a claim that the defendant was illegally sentenced because the defendant was at
large. See St. Brf. at 8-9. Rather than holding that it could review the sentence pursuant
to rule 22(e), the Court of Appeals actually stated that it would exercise its discretion to
consider this appeal on the merits because otherwise Vicente could file a rule 22(e)
motion in the trial court and prevail. Vicente, 2002 UT App 43, ^}3, n. 1. The rationale
for the Court of Appeals' decision was that instead of using additional resources by
requiring the defendant to jump through another hoop, the interests of judicial economy
favored resolving the appeal on its merits. IcL
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Because the Court of Appeals did not resolve the issue on the basis suggested by
the State in Point II of its brief, this Court need not resolve the issue of whether a
rule 22(e) review can be done on appeal when the defendant is absent.
(2) The State's Claim that an Appellate Court Cannot Conduct a Review of
an Illegal Sentence Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) Is
Inadequately Briefed.
This Court also need not resolve the issue raised by the State in Point II of its brief
because it is not adequately briefed as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.
See MacKav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 1998) (appellate court can disregard
issues that are not adequately briefed by appellant); State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135,
1HJ8-14, 47 P.3d 107 (same). Rule 24(a)(9) requires an appellant to include the
"contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ... with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." The State, the
petitioner in this case, fails to cite any authority in support of its claim that appellate
courts cannot review an issue pursuant to rule 22(e) when the defendant is absent. In
fact, the State's analysis is limited to a paragraph containing its bald assertion of this
claim. St. Brf. at 8. While the State does footnote a Court of Appeals case, it fails to
analyze how that case, which is both procedurally and substantively different from this
case, would require an appellate court to disregard a claim that the defendant was
illegally sentenced because the defendant is at large. St. Brf. at 8 n. 1.
After acknowledging that Brooks holds that rule 22(e) allows appellate review of
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a claim that defendant was illegally sentenced even if the claim was not raised below, the
State provides the following inadequate analysis of why the Brooks holding should not
apply when the defendant is at large:
Rule 22(e) does not, however, provide for review of an alleged illegal
sentence where review is barred for other reasons.[FN4] Nothing in this
Court's precedent nor in the history of rule 22(e) suggests that it provides
an avenue for appellate review where review is barred because of
defendant's fugitive status. The court of appeals' contrary conclusion was
incorrect.
[FN4] For instance, rule 22(e) does not provide for review of a
challenge to the legality of a sentence that is barred by res judicata.
See State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1996).
St. Brf. at 8. The State's discussion fails to analyze why Brooks does not control this
issue and allow review even if a defendant is a fugitive, fails to cite to any cases that
support the claim that this Court's precedent and the history of rule 22(e) preclude review
under these circumstances, fails to inform the Court or Respondent what portion of the
Vicente decision the State thinks makes the disputed conclusion, and fails to analyze the
applicability, if any, of the Clark decision. These failures are especially significant where
Brooks on its face allows for review regardless of whether the defendant is a fugitive. In
addition, the significance of the failure to discuss the impact of Clark, the only case
which the State seems to think supports its position, is apparent when that decision is
reviewed.
In Clark, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant who had raised a claim on
direct appeal that his sentence was illegal could not later make a motion pursuant to
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rule 22(e) that he was illegally sentenced. 913 P.2d at 362-63. The Court concluded that
while Brooks held that pursuant to rule 22(e), a defendant could raise a claim that he was
illegally sentenced at any time, "the court did not hold that a criminal defendant has the
right to repeatedly challenge his or her sentence on the same legal basis." IcL at 362.
According to the Court of Appeals, Clark's claim that he was illegally sentenced was
decided on the merits when his appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id. at 363.
The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that since Clark's claim had already been
decided, the doctrine of res judicata prevented Clark from again claiming that he was
illegally sentenced by filing a rule 22(e) motion. IdL at 362-63.
Aside from the fact that a Court of Appeals decision is not controlling in this
Court, Clark does not support the State's argument because it discusses repeated review
of a claim that a defendant was illegally sentenced and not an initial review on direct
appeal when the defendant is at large. Clark offers no guidance in resolving the issue of
whether rule 22(e) allows review of an unpreserved sentencing claim when the defendant
is absent. The State's failure to discuss what significance it believes Clark might have
and its failure to otherwise cite to any cases, statutes or rules supporting its claim
highlights the inadequacy of the briefing on this issue.
In addition, the State has failed to analyze why it believes that the Court of
Appeals had to resort to rule 22(e) in order to vacate the illegally imposed sentence in
this case. Vicente indicated in the Court of Appeals that his challenge to the legality of
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this sentence was preserved by Judge Frederick's entry of findings, conclusions and an
order sentencing Vicente in absentia. Appellant's opening brief in the Court of Appeals
at 2-3; see R. 48-49 in Addendum D. This Order was entered after Vicente's counsel
filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, claiming that Vicente was sentenced in
violation of due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a). R. 46-7; see
Addendum C. While Judge Frederick never held a hearing on the Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence, the entry of the Order following filing of that motion and the nature of
the Order itself demonstrate that the judge considered these issues. Although Vicente
alternatively argued that his claim that he was illegally sentenced could be reviewed
under plain error or exceptional circumstances doctrines, he nevertheless maintained that
his challenge to the illegal sentence was preserved. The State's failure to discuss
preservation and failure to cite to any portion of the record or the Vicente opinion in
support of its claim that the Court of Appeals improperly utilized rule 22(e) to reach an
unpreserved issue further demonstrates the inadequacy of the State's brief on this issue.
Because the State has inadequately briefed its claim in Point II, this Court should refuse
to review it.4

4

This Court could also refuse to reach the State's claim that an appellate court
cannot review a claim pursuant to rule 22(e) when the defendant is absent because this
issue is not fairly included in the question presented in the petition. The State articulated
the question presented as: "Did the court of appeals disregard controlling precedent when
it adjudicated the merits of defendant's appeal, notwithstanding defendant was a fugitive
from the law?" St. pet. at 1. In the argument section, the State argued that the Court of
Appeals failed to follow Hardy and automatically dismiss the appeal. St. pet. at 4-5.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Jose Luis Vicente respectfully requests that this Court affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Su

day of November, 2002.

<^fac C.\uX^y
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

Nowhere in the petition does the State even hint that it would like to also address the
question of whether Brooks applies when a defendant is at large. This lack of focus is
especially damaging because the Court of Appeals did not indicate that it was vacating
the sentence pursuant to rule 22(e) and Vicente had argued below that his claim that he
was illegally sentenced was preserved; neither Respondent nor this Court was given any
suggestion that the State thought that the Court of Appeals improperly utilized rule 22(e)
to vacate the illegal sentence until the State filed its brief on certiorari. Under such
circumstances, this Court could refuse to reach the issue raised by the State in Point II of
its brief.
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defendant who is a fugitive may be dismissed, subject
to reinstatement if the defendant returns to the
jurisdiction and if the State cannot demonstrate that it
will be prejudiced by reinstatement. See, e.g., State v.
Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1985). Because
Wanosik is dispositive of Vicente's appeal and requires
a remand for resentencing, we decline to dismiss this
appeal. [FN1] However, if Vicente appeals the
sentence imposed after remand, the State may raise the
dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal.

Joan C. Watt and Nisa J. Sisneros, Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake
City, for appellee.

Before JACKSON, BENCH, and GREENWOOD, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 Appellant Jose Luis Vicente appeals the sentence
on his conviction of Attempted Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a class
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (1999).
The issues raised in Vicente's appeal are the same
issues determined in State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App
241,31 P.3d 615, regarding sentencing in absentia and
a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
22(a) and Due Process rights. Accordingly, Vicente is
entitled to be resentenced under Wanosik because the
district court did not (1) make an adequate inquiry into
the actual voluntariness of Vicente's absence before
proceeding to sentence him in absentia; (2) provide
Vicente with the opportunity to present information
through counsel in mitigation of punishment and also
provide the prosecutor an opportunity to present
information relevant to sentencing; and (3) base the
sentencing decision on relevant and reliable
information regarding the crime, defendant's
background, and the interests of society. See id. at \ \
36-38.

FN1. Even if we were to dismiss this appeal,
Vicente could challenge the sentence in the
trial court under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R.Crim. P.
22(e) ("The court may correct ... a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.");
see also Wanosik, 241 UT App at n. 11
(stating issues regarding illegality of the
sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered
for the first time on appeal under Rule 22(e)).
Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the
appeal from the sentence and preserve the
State's ability to seek dismissal in any appeal
taken after resentencing.

We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in
accordance with Wanosik.
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The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying upon
cases concluding that an appeal taken by a criminal
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ADDENDUM B

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

ADDENDUM C

NISA J. SISNEROS (6654)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

MOTION TO CORRECT
ILLEGAL SENTENCE

-vJOSE LUIS CASTRO VICENTE,

:

Defendant.

:

Case No. 991907447FS
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant, Jose Luis Castro Vicente, by and through counsel, Nisa J. Sisneros, hereby objects
to the sentence imposed by the court on September 22, 2000 and moves the court to correct it's
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v.
Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah
1996). Mr. Vicente was not present at the sentencing. The court found that he had voluntarily
absented himself from the proceedings and sentenced him to the maximum jail sentence allowed
by law. However, Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states a defendant is
entitled to "make a statement and to present any mitigation of punishment, or show any legal
cause why sentence should not be imposed" Any imposition of sentence without Mr. Vicente's
presence violated his rights to due process and to allocution as found in the Constitution of Utah

art. I, §§ 7 & 12, and the 5 l \ 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. In
addition counsel for Mr. Vicente was not given the opportunity to address sentencing. At the
time of sentencing both the court and counsel were unaware as to why Mr. Vicente was not
present.
Rule 22 (b) allows the court to issue a bench warrant if a defendant fails to appear for
sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Vicente requests that the court correct it's sentence and issue a bench
warrant for his arrest allowing him to address the court prior to being sentenced.
Mr. Vicente requests the court set this matter for hearing.

DATED this 27th day of September, 2000.

NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office,
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

day of September, 2000.

ADDENDUM D

PILED DISTRICT COURT
Thlr^ ..'-"clal District

OCT-4
DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KEVIN MURPHY, 5768
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER SENTENCING
[DEFENDANT IN ABSENTIA

-vsJOSE LUIS C. VICENTE,
Defendant.

[CaseNo. ^ ^ O I ^ ' f - 7
[Hon. Judge Frederick

This case was called for sentencing on September 22, 2000. The State was represented
by Kevin Murphy of the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office; defense counsel Nisa
Sisneros was present. However, defendant did not appear. The court enters the following—
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court record reflects, and the Court finds, that defendant had written and oral
notice of the September 22, 2000, 8:30 AM sentencing hearing.
2. The Court finds that defendant has voluntarily absented him/herself from the sentencing
hearing.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b), it is appropriate that the defendant be sentenced in
absentia.

ORDERS
1. Based upon his conviction for Attempted Possession of Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute, a class A misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of one year
in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center.
2. The defendant is sentenced to pay a fine of $2500.00.
3. A no-bail warrant is issued for the defendant's arrest.
4. Defendant's one year jail commitment shall commence upon his/her arrest and booking
into the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center on the warrant.
DATED this
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day of September, 2
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order Sentencing Defendant in Absentia was delivered to Nisa
Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant Jose Vicente at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111 on the^T day of September, 2000.
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